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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we study jointly query reformulation and document
relevance estimation, the two essential aspects of information re-
trieval (IR). Their interactions are modelled as a two-player strategic
game: one player, a query formulator, taking actions to produce the
optimal query, is expected to maximize its own utility with respect
to the relevance estimation of documents produced by the other
player, a retrieval modeler; simultaneously, the retrieval modeler,
taking actions to produce the document relevance scores, needs to
optimize its likelihood from the training data with respect to the re-
fined query produced by the query formulator. Their equilibrium or
equilibria will be reached when both are the best responses to each
other. We derive our equilibrium theory of IR using normal-form
representations: when a standard relevance feedback algorithm is
coupled with a retrieval model, they would share the same objective
function and thus form a partnership game; by contrast, pseudo
relevance feedback pursues a rather different objective than that
of retrieval models, therefore the interaction between them would
lead to a general-sum game (though implicitly collaborative). Our
game-theoretical analyses not only yield useful insights into the
two major aspects of IR, but also offer new practical algorithms
for achieving the equilibrium state of retrieval which have been
shown to bring consistent performance improvements in both text
retrieval and item recommendation.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In information retrieval (IR), we have two distinctive yet correlated
research challenges. The first challenge lies in how to formulate
optimal queries in order to best represent the user’s information
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needs. In text retrieval, a fundamental theory is Rocchio’s relevance
feedback [26], i.e., in a vector space model setting, the optimal
query reformulation is achieved by making use of relevance feed-
back [7]. The idea is to have an iterative process for a search system
where the system takes the results that are initially returned from
a given query, gathers user feedback, and then utilizes the infor-
mation about whether or not those results are relevant to refine
and expand the terms in the query. In practice, the feedback signal
could be implicit (such as clicks or playlists) or blinded (assuming
the first top-k returned as relevant ones), depending on the spe-
cific cases [30]. In the case that no initial query is given such as in
collaborative filtering based recommender systems, the user’s in-
formation need completely relies on the “relevance feedback” from
historical interactions and may be inferred from other similar user
profiles [28]. The second challenge is concerned with relevance
estimation where the fundamental goal is to assign a relevance
score for each of the documents given the information need repre-
sentation (i.e., query). The classic information retrieval model [25],
its extension BM25 [23], and the language models [34] all utilize
term weighting in order to devise the document relevance scores,
whereas the latest machine learning methods such as learning to
rank [21] and the generative adversarial net (GAN) approach [29]
make use of historical relevance judgements to directly learn the
document scores.
In this paper, we aim to bring the two challenges together in a
single unified framework. Our study is based on game-theoretical
analysis. We assume that the information need does not change
throughout the session. The new equilibrium theory of information
retrieval states that, instead of considering the above two challenges
separately, there is a strategic game played simultaneously between
the query reformulation model and the retrieval model. More specif-
ically, the query reformulation player would refine the query that
is the best response to the actions from the given retrieval model
player, i.e., formulate an optimal query that would maximize its
utility (e.g., the score difference between relevant documents and
non-relevant documents) given the retrieval model. At the same
time, the retrieval model player would also need to produce the
document relevant estimation that is the best response toward the
formulated query, i.e., the relevance estimation would maximize
the retrieval utility (e.g., the likelihood function from the historical
user relevance judgements), given the query.
Thus, the game play provides the retrieval solution(s) that is
in a Nash equilibrium or multiple Nash equilibria [20] when each
becomes the best response to the other. This game-theoretical in-
formation retrieval solution is, however, a general one, as different
definitions of query reformulation and relevance estimation utili-
ties would lead to different ways approaching the retrieval process
equilibrium or equilibria. In this paper, we show that a joint play
between the standard relevance feedback and the document re-
trieval model would lead to a partnership game [27], whereas the
pseudo relevance feedback based query expansion would result
in a general-sum game [20] with the retrieval model. A practical
implementation is performed for evaluating our game-theoretical
approach in both text retrieval and collaborative filtering tasks. Our
results show that an equilibrium solution to relevance feedback
consistently outperforms other methods modelling query refor-
mulation and relevance estimation separately. Just using a linear
retrieval model our framework would improve the overall retrieval
performance in the case of pseudo relevance feedback. Furthermore,
compared with the simpler case where both components have the
same utility function, our framework provides better results with a
higher convergence rate.
2 RELATEDWORK
In information retrieval, Rocchio performed the first work [26] to in-
vestigate how to incorporate relevance feedback for refining queries
in a search system. The main idea behind Rocchio’s algorithm is
to update the initial query according to the user’s feedback that
whether a document in the collection is relevant or not. The goal
for Rocchio’s query reformulation is to identify an optimal query
that maximizes the separation between relevant documents and
non-relevant documents from the scores produced by a particular
retrieval model, namely
uR =
1
|Dr |
∑
di ∈Dr
ρ(di , q) − 1|Dn |
∑
di ∈Dn
ρ(di , q), (1)
where q is a query vector output from the query formulator and
Dr and Dn are the sets of relevant and non-relevant document
vectors denoted by d. ρ(di , q) is the retrieval model, producing the
relevance score for a document di given a query q. In essence, opti-
mizing the objective would allow terms to be selected from relevant
documents and the initial query to be expanded when relevance
feedback is given [10, 12]. Apart from relevance feedback based
query expansion, query can also be expanded via external knowl-
edge resources such as dictionaries, WordNet [19], ConceptNet [15]
and Wikipedia [14].
Pseudo relevance feedback (or retrieval feedback) [32], however,
is a more practical approach as users are usually not involved in
the process of relevance feedback and retrieved results are the
only feedback. In this case, Rocchio’s algorithm can be modified
for pseudo relevance feedback if assuming top-k retrieved docu-
ments are relevant while others are non-relevant. Query expansion
and reformulation have also been studied in the framework of Bi-
nary Independence Model [25] including Robertson Selection Value
(RSV) [24] and Kullback-Leibler divergence (KLD) [4]. Recently,
PMING distance [6] and word embedding technique [18] have also
been widely applied in IR. Besides term features, feedback mod-
els are also investigated. A term classification process [3] and a
posterior distribution for the feedback model [5] are proposed. A
cluster-based resampling method is presented in [13].
In this paper we study query reformulation but in a more gen-
eral setting where the learning of retrieval model is simultaneously
considered. Our work departs from that of [11, 25] whose focus is
on the term weighting only. Our work is also significantly different
from the risk minimization framework [11] in that we recognize
the fact that the objectives from the query process and the retrieval
process, although correlated, may not be necessarily identical (par-
ticularly in pseudo relevance feedback as we will illustrate later).
Interactive interface is studied in [17, 33, 35] where a search ses-
sion is modeled as a dual-agent stochastic game in [17] and card
playing in [35]. Our work is different from them in that we also
investigate different objectives for the query and retrieval model as
a general-sum game.
Modeling the interactions between them as a strategic game
would provide a sound foundation for understanding their dis-
crepancies such as query drifts and its stability issue [5] (more
discussion will be provided in the next section). This paper is built
upon the foundation of game theory [20] in particular normal-form
game. In a strategic game, each player has a reward that depends
on the strategies of all the players rather than itself only. In order
to achieve its goal, the player learns a policy to perform actions
based on the observations of other players’ strategies and the en-
vironment. In a Nash equilibrium each player’s choice is the best
response to the others and no player can gain by unilateral devia-
tion from the joint strategy. The above provides a sound theoretical
foundation for us to understand the retrieval processes which may
have different objectives. Under the game-theoretical framework,
we unify the relevance feedback and retrieval modeling, and the
two components are expected to be able to help each other and
finally improve the performance of retrieval.
3 THE EQUILIBRIUM THEORY OF IR
In this section, we start with the problem settings, and then present
our IR game theory with relevance feedback and pseudo relevance
feedback and discuss their differences.
In an IR system, the user submits an initial query which (roughly)
represents the information need. The query is denoted by a vec-
tor q with the dimension of vocabulary size, where its element qj
represents the binary occurrence of a term j in the query. Each
document di is represented by a binary vector over the term vo-
cabulary V , where each dimension dj represents whether the term
j is contained in the document (1) or not (0). We focus on binary
relevance. Specifically, given the user’s information need clued by
the query, each candidate document di has an underlying ground-
truth relevance score ri , which is 1 for relevant documents and 0 for
non-relevant ones. The IR task is to find relevant documents given
a new query with 1) the information about previous queries and
their relevance judgements, and 2) possibly some initial relevant
judgements for the new query. To achieve the task, one can build
up a refined query and a retrieval model to assess the relevance of
the documents in the collection.
In this paper, the IR task is modelled in a normal-form game [20].
Formally, the game has three elements: two players (query formu-
lator Q and retrieval model M) , the pure strategies {SQ , SM } for
player Q andM and the utility functions {uQ ,uM }.
Definition 3.1. An IR Strategic Game is a tuple ⟨P, S,U ⟩, where
• P = {Q,M} is the set of two players: query formulator Q
and retrieval modelM ;
• S = SQ × SM , where SQ and SM are finite sets of strategies
available to playerQ andM . The strategies of the two players
are denoted by sq and sm respectively where sq ∈ SQ , sm ∈
SM . In text retrieval, sq , for instance, is a binary vector of
Table 1: An IR game example (relevance feedback).
d1 d2
t1 1 0
t2 0 1
r 1 0
(a) Corpus
sm1 =
{1, 0.2}
sm2 =
{0.2, 1}
sq1 = {1, 0} -1.0064 -1.2913
sq2 = {0, 1} -1.4913 -2.0064
(b) Utilities of Strategies
vocabulary size |V | with its element representing whether
the term is included in the query or not. On the other hand,
sm is a weight vector of the retrieval model that instantiates
a retrieval model to distinguish the relevant documents from
the non-relevant ones given the query q.
• Finally, an equilibrium state should be achieved when both
of them have no incentive to change their strategies s∗q
and s∗m , where uQ (s∗q , s∗m ) ≥ uQ (sq , s∗m ) and uM (s∗q , s∗m ) ≥
uM (s∗q , sm ) for any sq and sm .
In practice, we consider a mixed strategy case where each strat-
egy of the player is assigned a probability, and we assume that each
element (such as a term, a document or an item) in a strategy is
independent of each other. On the top of it, we can approximate
the probability by the likelihood of all the elements in the strategy.
The details are discussed below.
3.1 IR Game with Relevance Feedback
For relevance feedback task, the utilities of query formulator Q
and retrieval modelM are the same, i.e., the degree of successfully
distinguishing relevant documents from the non-relevant ones. The
common utility u(sq , sm ) can be defined as
u(sq , sm ) = 1|Dr |
∑
di ∈Dr
logp(r = 1|di , q;θ ) −
1
|Dn |
∑
di ∈Dn
logp(r = 0|di , q;θ ), (2)
whereDr andDn are the ground-truth of relevant and non-relevant
document sets for the user’s information need respectively and θ
represents the relevance score given by the retrieval model. In
such a case, the IR game becomes a partnership game [27], where
each player receives an identical reward and acts independently
while optimizing the above global objective function. The Nash
equilibria correspond to local optima of the objective function. It is
worth mentioning that a partnership game allows each player to
have a different cost function, which in our case would be different
constraints or learning regularizations reinforced for the query
reformulation method and the retrieval model, independently and
separately.
To illustrate this, we present a simple example of the IR game
with relevance feedback. Suppose we have two terms t1 and t2 and
two documents d1 and d2. One can depend on Binary Independence
Model [25] to establish each term’s underlying correlation with the
document relevance, given the information need (no need a specific
query).
Table 1a gives example term binary occurrence in the documents
and the underlying relevance of each term, where Dr = {d1} and
Dn = {d2}. Table 1b shows the corresponding common utilities
w.r.t. different strategies of the two players. sq1 = {1, 0} means the
Table 2: An IR game example (pseudo relevance feedback).
d1 d2
t1 1 0
t2 0 1
r 1 0
(a) Corpus
sm1 =
{1, 0.2}
sm2 =
{0.2, 1}
sq1 = {1, 0} (-1.0064,
-1.0064)
(-1.2913,
-1.2913)
sq2 = {0, 1} (-1.2913,
-1.4913)
(-1.0064,
-2.0064)
(b) Utilities of Strategies (uQ , uM )
query is t1 only and sq2 = {0, 1}means the query is t2 only. Suppose
the model parameter space has only two points: sm1 = {1, 0.2}
means to assign the weight 1 to θ1 for d1 and 0.2 to θ2 for d2 ;
sm2 = {0.2, 1} means to assign the weight 0.2 to θ1 and 1 to θ2 to
calculate the query-document relevance score p(r = 1|di , q;θ ) as
p(r = 1|di , q;θ ) = sigmoid
(
θ1q1di1 + θ2q2di2
)
(3)
and based on which ranks them and selects the top one. The utility
score is based on the underlying relevance score of the returned
document by the retrieval model.
It is easy to calculate that this IR game has a Nash equilibrium
at (sq1 = {1, 0}, sm1 = {1, 0.2}). In such a case, via Eq. (3) we have
p(r = 1|d1, q;θ ) = sigmoid(1 × 1 × 1 + 0.2 × 0 × 0) = 0.7311
p(r = 1|d2, q;θ ) = sigmoid(1 × 1 × 0 + 0.2 × 0 × 1) = 0.5
and thus via Section 3.1 the common utility is
u(sq , sm ) = logp(r = 1|d1, q;θ ) + logp(r = 0|d2, q;θ ) = −1.0064.
With the iteration between the two players, the updated query
and retrieval model will both converge to the equilibrium, which
in a more practical setting corresponding to the local optimal of
the objective.
3.2 IR Game with Pseudo Relevance Feedback
For pseudo relevance feedback task, the utilities of query formulator
Q and retrieval model M are different. Specifically, the utility of
the retrieval model is still the degree of successfully distinguishing
relevant documents from the non-relevant ones, which we copy
here:
uM (sq , sm ) = 1|Dr |
∑
di ∈Dr
logp(r = 1|di , q;θ ) −
1
|Dn |
∑
di ∈Dn
logp(r = 0|di , q;θ ). (4)
However, the utility of the query formulator Q is solely based on
the feedback from the retrieval modelM
uQ (sq , sm ) = 1|Dk |
∑
di ∈Dk
logp(r = 1|di , q;θ ) −
1
N − |Dk |
∑
di<Dk
logp(r = 0|di , q;θ ), (5)
where Dk is the top-k document list ranked by the retrieval model
given the query representation q and N is the number of documents
in the dataset. The discrepancies between Section 3.2 indicate that
the utilities of two players are not necessary the same in pseudo rel-
evance feedback scenarios and the IR retrieval game only represents
an implicit coordination between them.
To illustrate this, we present a simple toy example for the pseudo
relevance feedback setting. Similar to Table 1a, here Table 2a presents
the sample term binary occurrence in the documents and the un-
derlying relevance of each term. Table 2b shows the corresponding
utilities w.r.t. different strategies of the two players. The pure strate-
gies of two players are set as the same as in Table 1b. And the
query-document relevance score p(r = 1|di , q;θ ) is calculated just
as in Eq. (3). The utility scores uq and um are then calculated by
Section 3.2 respectively. For example, when (sq2 = {0, 1}, sm1 =
{1, 0.2}), we have
p(r = 1|d1, q;θ ) = sigmoid(1 × 0 × 1 + 0.2 × 1 × 0) = 0.5
p(r = 1|d2, q;θ ) = sigmoid(1 × 0 × 0 + 0.2 × 1 × 1) = 0.5498.
Thus d2 ranks higher than d1, i.e., d2 ∈ Dk and d1 < Dk here. As
such, the utility of Q andM are
uQ (sq2 , sm1 ) = logp(r = 1|d2, q;θ ) + logp(r = 0|d1, q;θ ) = −1.2913
uM (sq2 , sm1 ) = logp(r = 1|d1, q;θ ) + logp(r = 0|d2, q;θ ) = −1.4913,
which are different because the ranking is not the same as the
ground-truth.
From Table 2b we can observe that (i) uQ and uM can largely
depart when the query representation is at a wrong region (e.g., sq2 ).
(ii) When the query representation is already at the wrong region
(e.g., sq2 ), the pseudo relevance feedback model could result in a
wrongly optimistic assessment (e.g., uQ (sq2 , sm2 ) > uM (sq2 , sm2 ))
(see the down-right corner). This explains the reason why pseudo
relevance feedback would easily result in query drifts if no con-
straint was reinforced. With pseudo relevance feedback alone, it is
difficult to spot the drifts given the high utility value of the query
reformulation. However, as shown in the down-right corner, the util-
ity of the retrieval model is in fact very low, which provides a strong
indication of the drifts and potentially prevents them when strategi-
cally considering the retrieval model in the game. (iii) Nonetheless,
there is still a Nash equilibrium at (sq1 = {1, 0}, sm1 = {1, 0.2}),
which is the unique optima of this IR game.
4 APPLICATIONS
We study the applications of IR game on two typical IR scenar-
ios, namely ad-hoc text retrieval and collaborative filtering based
recommender systems.
4.1 Text Retrieval
In the text retrieval task, in order to find a good representation of
information need, the query q tries to assign higher probability to
terms only existing in relevant documents instead of those in non-
relevant documents. On the other hand, the retrieval model tries to
make the prediction more accurate given the current query infor-
mation representation. For concise notation, we use θi to denote
the predicted relevance between q and di by the retrieval model
and ϕ indicates the parameter of a linear retrieval model which
we will use later. We analyze several different equilibrium learning
cases that are possible to happen in the game for text retrieval. Our
algorithm is closely related to Fictitious Play [1] that each player
always plays the best response of others at each iteration using
gradient ascent.
4.1.1 Case 1:Query Iteration. In this case, the parameterϕ of the
retrieval modelM is fixed and the query formulator Q is updated
iteratively via Gradient Ascent. We use vector inner product to
calculate the predictions
θi = sigmoid(q⊤di ) = 11 + e−q⊤di . (6)
Thus Q could constantly update q by maximizing uQ (sq , sm ) as in
Section 3.2 with gradient methods:
∂uQ (sq , sm )
∂q
=
1
|Dr |
∑
di ∈Dr
(1 − θi )di −
1
|Dn |
∑
di ∈Dn
θidi , (7)
q ← q + η ∂uQ (sq , sm )
∂q
, (8)
where η is the learning rate.
If there is only one retrieval process and no feedback provided,
we call it naive retrieval. Besides, if the game has only one round
where relevance feedback is produced only once, the case reduces
to Rocchio’s algorithm [26]. If infinite rounds are allowed in this
game, the query reformulation is expected to converge to a state
where its utility uQ is maximized. We name it Conv-Q.
4.1.2 Case 2: Retrieval Model Iteration. In this case, the query
representation is fixed while the retrieval model tries to maximize
its utility as shown in Section 3.2. For generality, we define a simple
linear retrieval model whose relevance score is the weighted sum of
three different weighting schemes (result fusion), including binary
vector space model (VSM), TDIDF and BM25. The document di in
the k-th weighting scheme can be represented as a vector dki of
vocabulary size and the query has the same representation qk . Thus
the representation of document di and the query q is a set of feature
vectors d = {d1, ..., dK } and q = {q1, ..., qK }, where K = 3. Cosine
distance is used to determine the relevance between a document
and the query in each weighting scheme. The score θi assigned
to document di is the weighted sum of scores in all K weighting
schemes:
θi = sigmoid
( K∑
k=1
wk · (dki )⊤qk
)
, (9)
whereϕ = {w1, ...,wK } are parameters of the linear retrieval model.
We can updatewk according to
∂uM (sq , sm )
∂wk
=
1
|Dr |
∑
di ∈Dr
(1 − θi ) · (dki )⊤qk −
1
|Dn |
∑
di ∈Dn
θi · (dki )⊤qk , (10)
wk ← wk + η
∂uM (sq , sm )
∂wk
, (11)
to maximize the utility. Finally, the retrieval model is expected
to converge to an optima where the retrieval model utility uM is
maximized. We name such a case as Conv-M.
In fact, there are many other learnable retrieval models such as
support vector machines, boosted trees and neural networks [2].
Since our focus in this paper is not the retrieval model itself, but
the IR game theory, we will not explore these sophisticated models
here.
4.1.3 Case 3: Equilibrium of the Query and Retrieval Model. In
this case, both the query formulator Q and the retrieval model
M try to maximize their own utility. But at the same time, their
strategies are involved with each other in each round of the game.
The strategy of the retrieval model depends on the information
representation of the query, and in turn, the strategy of the query
formulator depends on the retrieval results to adjust the weight
of each term in the query. Therefore, in each round of the game,
the query and the retrieval model can be updated as Sections 4.1.1
and 4.1.2. Finally, both of them are expected to reach an equilibrium
where the query and the retrieval model would not change their
strategy. We call this case Equil-Q&M.
4.2 Item Recommendation
In this section, we extend our solution to personalized recommen-
dation scenario, where there is no explicit query terms but the user
profiles are represented by the items that have been consumed
historically from the users.
4.2.1 User-based item recommendation. User-based recommen-
dation is quite similar to text retrieval, where the vocabulary can
be regarded as a pool of items and the initial query is the profile
of the target user. To be specific, the target user’s initial profile is
the set of items that were rated previously. We use vector qu to
represent the target user’s profile. Each element in qu represents
the rating given by the user to the item and 0 otherwise. In the
memory based, there is a set of N users in total whose profiles
can also be represented as a vector, {d1, ..., di , ..., dN }. On the top
of it, the query is equivalent to the target user’s profile qu , and
the retrieval model is to predict the relevance between the target
user and any other user, similarly denoted by θi = p(r = 1|di , qu ).
However, in the user-based recommendation task, it is difficult to
directly obtain the relevance r between target user and other users.
Thus only pseudo relevance feedback can be applied, in which the
top-k similar users are considered to be relevant neighbors while
the others are non-relevant. Dr and Dn denote the sets of relevant
and non-relevant users respectively.
There are three cases in the user-based item recommendation,
similar to the cases discussed in Section 4.1. The first case is Roc-
chio’s algorithm and Conv-Q where only the target user’s profile
is updated according to Section 4.1.1. In the second case (Conv-M),
we define the retrieval model as
θi = p(r = 1|di , qu ) = sigmoid(q⊤uWdi ), (12)
where W is the parameters of the retrieval model. Using gradient
descent, W can be updated by
W←W + η ©­« 1|Dr |
∑
di ∈Dr
(1 − θi )qud⊤i −
1
|Dn |
∑
di ∈Dn
θiqud⊤i
ª®¬ .
(13)
The third case (Equil-Q&M) is that both target user’s profile qu
and retrieval model parameter W are updated in each round of the
game according to Section 4.1.1 and Eq. (13) for different utility
functions, respectively, using gradient ascent.
5 EXPERIMENTS
Using public benchmarking datasets, we have conducted prelimi-
nary experiments on both text retrieval and item recommendation,
in order to verify our proposed theory of IR game equilibrium.
5.1 Text Retrieval
In the text retrieval task, we use the set of documents in TREC disks
4 & 5 [8]. There are 250 topics along with a collection of judged
documents. The relevance judgements are given for some part of
documents for each topic. For each topic, the average number of
judged documents is 1250 (with average vocabulary size 48810.91),
and the average number of relevant documents is 74.07.
5.1.1 Experiment setup. Documents in TREC disks 4 & 5 are tok-
enized and stemmed using Snowball stemmer in NLTK toolkit [16].
After that, stop-words and punctuation are filtered for each doc-
ument. As for the topic, each topic includes three parts: “title”,
“description” and “narrative”. We preprocess the raw topic data in
the same way as the documents. The average number of tokens is
2.6 in “title”, 8.6 in “description” and 25.7 in “narrative”. We attain
the vocabulary from the judged documents for each topic, which
greatly reduces the size of vocabulary for our experiments. For each
document, we calculate term weight in three weighting schemes
(VSM, TFIDF and BM25) and use them to initialize the query and
each document vector respectively, which is indicated in Tables
3 and 4. In practice, we initialize the query using tokens in “title”
and we constrain query expansion among tokens existing in “title”
and “description” in each round of the game. We assume that words
in “description” are the candidates for query expansion and our
model is to learn the weights of these words as the query to improve
the retrieval performance. In order to test the performance of our
model, we apply a 3:1 random spliting on the documents in each
topic where the ratio of relevance and non-relevance documents is
identical in test and train sets. In relevance feedback, we assume
that after each iteration the relevance signal is simulated by virtue
users on the set of documents. While in pseudo relevance feedback,
the top-10 documents are regarded as relevant documents in our
experiment. It is reasonable to use all documents as feedback as
the average number of other documents in the training set is 939.
The learning rate is 0.1 for query reformulation and 1 for retrieval
model in both relevance feedback and pseudo relevance feedback.
We also tried other values of learning rate and found that small
learning rate for query reformulation could avoid fast query drift.
If the average update on the weights of query and retrieval model
falls below a threshold (we set 10−7 in the experiment), it is deemed
to reach an equilibrium state. The maximum number of iteration is
2000 as most cases converge within 2000 iterations.
5.1.2 Results and discussion. We provide NDCG, MAP, MRR
and Precision along with the standard deviation over the whole
dataset. The results are displayed in Tables 3 and 4. The utility on
the test set during the training process is also shown in Fig. 1. For
relevance feedback, Conv-Q shows better performance than naive
and Rocchio, which indicates that a good representation of query
can greatly boost performance of text retrieval. Conv-M presents
worse performance on the test set, although the utility of retrieval
model increases during the training process. The reason might be
Table 3: Text retrieval results (relevance feedback)where the
performance scores are given in the format of mean ± std
and * indicates a significant improvement according to the
Wilcoxon signed-rank test over Rocchio at p < 0.05.
Algorithm NDCG@10 NDCG@30 MRR
Naive (VSM) 0.395±0.37 0.412±0.32 0.352±0.38
Naive (TFIDF) 0.511±0.37 0.528±0.33 0.478±0.41
Naive (BM25) 0.504±0.37 0.517±0.32 0.459±0.40
Rocchio (VSM) 0.407±0.37 0.422±0.32 0.367±0.39
Rocchio (TFIDF) 0.519±0.38 0.536±0.33 0.487±0.41
Rocchio (BM25) 0.518±0.37 0.531±0.32 0.474±0.40
Conv-Q (VSM) 0.527±0.34 0.554±0.29 0.475±0.39
Conv-Q (TFIDF) 0.568±0.35 0.571±0.30 0.530±0.40
Conv-Q (BM25) 0.563±0.35 0.573±0.30 0.522±0.40
Conv-M 0.463±0.38 0.482±0.34 0.431±0.41
Equil-Q&M 0.583±0.34 0.601*±0.29 0.537*±0.39
Algorithm P@10 P@30 MAP
Naive (VSM) 0.152±0.18 0.134±0.15 0.184±0.16
Naive (TFIDF) 0.221±0.22 0.179±0.18 0.263±0.23
Naive (BM25) 0.217±0.22 0.178±0.17 0.262±0.23
Rocchio (VSM) 0.162±0.18 0.139±0.15 0.193±0.17
Rocchio (TFIDF) 0.225±0.22 0.186±0.18 0.276±0.24
Rocchio (BM25) 0.221±0.21 0.183±0.17 0.272±0.24
Conv-Q (VSM) 0.245±0.23 0.212±0.18 0.288±0.22
Conv-Q (TFIDF) 0.264±0.24 0.220±0.20 0.317±0.25
Conv-Q (BM25) 0.265±0.24 0.214±0.20 0.319±0.25
Conv-M 0.190±0.20 0.160±0.16 0.238±0.21
Equil-Q&M 0.278*±0.24 0.233±0.19 0.331*±0.25
the narrow explore space for the retrieval model as the model is
a linear model with only four parameters to train. Our focus is to
investigate the performance of cooperation between the query and
retrieval model. More complicated models can be our future work.
In addition, significant improvement can be seen in Equil-Q&M.
It is due to the fact that the model could make use of relevance
feedback to do query reformulation and also improve the retrieval
model. Finally, the overall model can learn a better representation
of the query and a better retrieval model to discriminate relevant
and non-relevant documents. The best performance of Equil-Q&M
shows that the query representation and the retrieval model can be
(implicitly) coordinated in our game framework to finally achieve
better results.
For the test on pseudo relevance feedback, we notice that Conv-Q
has worse performance than the baseline. It is intuitively under-
standable because the update of query entirely relies on the top-k
retrieved documents from the model. The top-k documents may
contain much noise for the query reformulation. When there are
only fewer relevant documents for a topic (k = 10) for instance, it is
difficult for Conv-Q to capture the term distribution in relevant and
non-relevant documents. But even under this pseudo assumption,
Equil-Q&M, with the help of updating retrieval model, is able to
overcome the situation where the query gets a worse representa-
tion, and obtains better results than both Conv-Q and Conv-M. This
is consistent with our observation in our toy example in Table 2b
where in the right down corner, iterative query expansion with
Table 4: Text retrieval results (pseudo relevance feedback).
Algorithm NDCG@10 NDCG@30 MRR
Naive (VSM) 0.323±0.38 0.378±0.29 0.287±0.36
Naive (TFIDF) 0.463±0.36 0.493±0.30 0.413±0.38
Naive (BM25) 0.439±0.35 0.474±0.28 0.375±0.36
Rocchio (VSM) 0.323±0.36 0.378±0.30 0.285±0.36
Rocchio (TFIDF) 0.460±0.36 0.493±0.30 0.410±0.38
Rocchio (BM25) 0.444±0.35 0.477±0.29 0.386±0.37
Conv-Q (VSM) 0.245±0.34 0.308±0.29 0.228±0.33
Conv-Q (TFIDF) 0.428±0.37 0.465±0.32 0.370±0.38
Conv-Q (BM25) 0.400±0.36 0.456±0.30 0.349±0.36
Conv-M 0.415±0.37 0.447±0.31 0.367±0.39
Equil-Q&M 0.469*±0.37 0.499±0.31 0.397±0.38
Algorithm P@10 P@30 MAP
Naive (VSM) 0.112±0.14 0.100±0.12 0.158±0.15
Naive (TFIDF) 0.200±0.21 0.142±0.14 0.239±0.22
Naive (BM25) 0.187±0.20 0.137±0.13 0.226±0.21
Rocchio (VSM) 0.108±0.14 0.100±0.12 0.157±0.16
Rocchio (TFIDF) 0.207±0.22 0.145±0.14 0.244±0.23
Rocchio (BM25) 0.193±0.20 0.141±0.14 0.233±0.22
Conv-Q (VSM) 0.095±0.15 0.090±0.12 0.138±0.15
Conv-Q (TFIDF) 0.211±0.23 0.150±0.16 0.253±0.24
Conv-Q (BM25) 0.180±0.21 0.143±0.15 0.234±0.23
Conv-M 0.154±0.17 0.122±0.13 0.205±0.19
Equil-Q&M 0.223*±0.16 0.162*±0.16 0.257±0.23
Figure 1: Utility in both cases of relevance feedback.
pseudo relevance feedback would result in query drifts given the
high (wrong) utility value of the query reformulation alone. How-
ever, strategically coupled with the retrieval model in the game,
the new equilibrium learning shall prevent query drifts from the
correct utility signal introduced by the retrieval model.
To understand the convergence of the learning process, we
present the results of average NDCG, MAP, MRR and precision
overtime after each iteration in Fig. 2. In relevance feedback, it is
not difficult to notice that values of NDCG, MAP, precision and
MRR on test set decreases slightly during the first several iterations,
due to the worse performance of retrieval model on test set. But
with the help of query reformulation, the performance becomes
much better and finally exceeds Conv-Q. This proves that the coor-
dination between the query and retrieval model can help to boost
the overall performance of text retrieval. For pseudo relevance feed-
back, it shows more iterations do not help the retrieval model due
to the reason discussed before. However, even when Conv-M gets
worse results, the query reformulation can avoid the situation and
help Equil-Q&M discover a better representation.
(a) standard relevance feedback
(b) pseudo relevance feedback
Figure 2: Test performance of the relevance feedback and the pesudo relevance feedback after each iteration.
5.2 Item Recommendation
5.2.1 User-based item recommendation. For recommendation,
we limit our experiment on the Movielens(100k) dataset [9] only,
while leaving the study of scalability on a larger dataset for future
work. In the user-based recommendation, we apply a 3:1 random
splitting for users between the training and the test. For each user
in the test set, we keep 75% item ratings as its history and initialize
the rate of the other 25% items (test items) with zero. Due to the
fact that there is not any ground-truth user-user similarity rele-
vance feedback provided, only the experiment on pseudo relevance
feedback is conducted. In Rocchio algorithm, the rate of test items
is updated once according to the similarity of other user’s in the
memory base while other three cases follow an iterative process
the same as the text retrieval. The learning rate is set to be 0.1. We
also tried other values of learning rate and found that 0.1 showed
the best performance. Similarly, the parameters of the retrieval
model are updated 50 times within an iteration in Conv-M and
Equil-Q&M as most test users converges after 50 iterations. The
threshold that we consider that the query or retrieval model reaches
an equilibrium state is 10−4 in this case.
The test results are shown in Table 5 and the learning curves
(performance over the test users) after each iteration are shown in
Fig. 3. We find that Conv-M did not perform well in the later stage
of the iterations. Equil-Q&M exceeds the other cases and helps the
iterative process of jointly play between the query and the retrieval
model improve slightly further. Even though Conv-M shows worse
performance in the later stage, Equil-Q&M can still correct the
situation and exceed the performance of Equil-Q.
6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTUREWORK
In this paper, we presented a novel equilibrium theory of infor-
mation retrieval that considers a strategic game played between
the query formulator and the retrieval model. We showed that the
strategic game would allow us to jointly study the two correlated
Table 5: User-based recommendation results.
Algorithm NDCG@10 NDCG@30 MRR
Rocchio 0.194±0.31 0.220±0.28 0.167±0.28
Conv-Q 0.201±0.31 0.234±0.28 0.172±0.29
Conv-M 0.199±0.32 0.223±0.29 0.170±0.30
Equil-Q&M 0.204*±0.31 0.237±0.28 0.174*±0.29
Algorithm P@10 P@30 MAP
Rocchio 0.111±0.20 0.039±0.07 0.021±0.03
Conv-Q 0.113±0.19 0.043±0.07 0.024±0.03
Conv-M 0.111±0.21 0.040±0.07 0.022±0.03
Equil-Q&M 0.116±0.19 0.045*±0.07 0.025±0.03
problems which may or may not have the same optimization objec-
tive. We provided the insights into the equilibrium learning process
and discussed the resulting practical learning algorithms in the
scenarios of text retrieval and collaborative filtering. The exper-
imental results have confirmed that the equilibrium solution to
(pseudo) relevance feedback would consistently outperform other
competitive baseline algorithms for both text retrieval and item
recommendation applications. Specifically, in the case of standard
relevance feedback where both players of the game have the same
utility function, our game-theoretical framework achieved superior
empirical performance with a high convergence rate. Furthermore,
in the case of pseudo relevance feedback, coupling the query refor-
mulator with the retrieval model in the strategic game could help
to mitigate the query drift problem.
For the future work, we shall perform a deeper inquiry of utility
design in the proposed normal-form IR game to further optimize
the equilibrium performance of (pseudo) relevance feedback. More
real-world application scenarios, including online advertising, so-
cial network recommendation, and collaborative filtering, will be
investigated. We also plan to explore more efficient Nash equilib-
rium learning using reinforcement learning techniques [22], and
Figure 3: Test performance of the user-based item recommendation after each game iteration.
extend the normal-form game to extensive-form game to deal with
the dynamical nature of information retrieval [31].
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